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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1 
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics is based 
at Fordham University School of Law and sponsors 
programs, develops publications, supports scholarship 
on contemporary issues of law and ethics, and 
encourages professional and public institutions to 
integrate moral perspectives into their work.  Over the 
past decade, the Stein Center and affiliated Fordham 
Law faculty have examined the ethical dimensions of 
the administration of criminal justice, including the 
ethical and historical dimensions of the death penalty 
and execution methods.  The Stein Center has sub-
mitted amicus briefs in two prior cases in which 
the Court has been asked to examine methods of 
execution:  Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999), cert. 
dismissed as improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 
(2000), which the Court had granted to consider 
whether electrocution violated the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), in which the Court 
examined the constitutionality of lethal injection as 
implemented in Kentucky and in which the Court 
cited the Stein Center brief. 
Implementation of lethal injection as a method of 
execution implicates ethical questions important to 
the Stein Center.  The evolution of execution methods 
in the United States generally suggests a public 
consensus opposed to the infliction of severe pain and 
                                           
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to the filing 
of this brief. Letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. No 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund 
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than 
amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. 
2 
suffering in the course of executing individuals 
sentenced to death.  At the same time, it is doubtful 
whether in practice execution methods achieve that 
goal.  In the context of lethal injection, there are 
serious concerns whether prison officials, legislators, 
and courts have responded to the risks associated with 
the implementation of lethal injection in an ethical 
manner. 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The landscape of the implementation of lethal 
injection has changed greatly in the seven years since 
this Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 
(2008).  During this time, States have moved away 
from the three-drug protocol synonymous with lethal 
injection since its adoption—a protocol to which 
States adhered for decades.  Such changes have been 
implemented not by state legislatures, but by prison 
officials charged with carrying out lethal injection 
executions.  This brief analyzes how the history of 
execution methods informs the Court’s analysis of 
Petitioners’ challenge to Oklahoma’s most recent 
revision to its lethal injection protocol. 
(1) As the Court recognized in Baze, the history of 
execution methods in the United States demonstrates 
that States moved toward new methods in an effort 
to execute inmates in a humane manner free from 
unnecessary pain.  Historically, laws switching execu-
tion methods came about as society became more 
aware of the risks associated with a certain execution 
method, e.g., when electrocutions produced horrific 
scenes of burning flesh, or when lethal gas resulted in 
the slow asphyxiation in the gas chamber.  Such 
legislative action meant this Court rarely had occasion 
3 
to examine the constitutionality of an execution 
method under the Eighth Amendment. 
(2) When States adopted lethal injection as an 
execution method, the great majority of States left 
statutes purposefully vague as to the lethal injection 
procedure. Oklahoma developed a three-drug lethal 
injection protocol in 1977.  That protocol, which nearly 
every lethal injection State and the federal 
government subsequently copied, lacked adequate 
medical or scientific basis.  Notwithstanding the 
Court’s decision in Baze approving the three-drug 
protocol, States have moved away from the original 
three-drug protocol in recent years.  Such changes 
resulted not from deliberate evaluation of the merits 
of modified protocols or from legislative enactment, 
but from court decree or practical considerations.   
(3) Because States delegate the details of lethal 
injection executions to prison officials, protocols are 
not subject to public scrutiny and oversight.  On the 
one hand, this system leaves departments of 
corrections with the ability to create and implement 
alternatives to existing procedures.  On the other 
hand, prison officials have continued to adopt 
protocols lacking sufficient scientific or medical basis.  
The responsibility for ensuring that executions do not 
risk unnecessary cruelty or lingering death thus lies 
with the courts.  Judicial review of such protocols is 
necessary to ensure that administration of lethal 
injection comports with the Eighth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. HISTORICALLY, PUBLIC AWARENESS OF 
THE UNNECESSARY RISK OF PAIN AND 
SUFFERING OF A PRIOR EXECUTION 
METHOD HAS CAUSED STATE 
LEGISLATURES TO ADOPT A NEW 
METHOD. 
As is well documented, the federal government and 
every State that has the death penalty employ lethal 
injection as the method of execution.  Prior to lethal 
injection, States switched methods when pre-existing 
methods were shown in practice to embody a high  
risk of painful or lingering death.  In large part, the 
coordinated move from one execution method to 
another took place by legislative dictate rather than 
judicial decree.  See generally Deborah W. Denno, 
When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling 
Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal 
Injection and What it Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 
63 (2002).  With the exception of a few States that 
permitted use of the firing squad, the general 
historical trend in the United States led to the 
transition from hanging to electrocution, which gave 
way briefly to reliance on the gas chamber, before 
settling on lethal injection.   
Hanging. In the mid-nineteenth century, States 
typically favored the use of hanging as the method of 
execution, while three States allowed for execution by 
firing squad.2  By 1853, hanging had become “the 
                                           
2 No State currently relies on the firing squad as the primary 
method of execution and only Utah and Oklahoma still authorize 
the firing squad as an alternative to lethal injection under some 
limited circumstances.  See Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 
2013 – Statistical Tables, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bull. No. 
5 
nearly universal form of execution in the United 
States and 48 States imposed death by this method.” 
Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 114 S. Ct. 2125, 
2125 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted).  The method required “no equipment beyond 
a rope and a high structure,” and “no expertise beyond 
the ability to tie a knot.”  STUART BANNER, THE DEATH 
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 44 (2003).  Despite 
the seeming simplicity of the method, hanging had 
begun to fall out of favor by the late 1800s, after the 
public witnessed gruesomely botched hangings that 
involved decapitations and slow strangulations.3  
Societal awareness of the “[b]ungled hangings [that] 
often caused intense pain and on occasion failed to kill” 
led legislatures to search for a more humane method 
of execution.  BANNER, supra, at 175; In re Kemmler, 
136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) (describing the quest to 
determine “‘whether the science of the present day’” 
could find a “less barbarous manner” of execution than 
hanging) (quotation marks omitted).   
By 1994, only two States employed hanging as an 
execution method.  See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 
                                           
NCJ 248448, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, at 4 & 7 tbl. 2 
(Dec. 19, 2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty= 
pbdetail&iid=5156; Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less than the 
Dignity of Man: Evolving Standards, Botched Executions and 
Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 335, 337 (2003) (noting the historical use of the firing squad 
but that only a few States had statutes permitting its use).  In 
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), the Court held that death 
by firing squad did not rank among the “cruel and unusual 
punishments” banned by the Eighth Amendment, but the Court 
did so without “defin[ing] with exactness the extent of the 
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual 
punishments shall not be inflicted.”  99 U.S. at 134-36.  
3 BANNER, supra, at 172-75. 
6 
app. B at 726-29 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).  In that 
year, this Court declined to review a decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
that held that the State of Washington’s use of 
hanging as a method of execution did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment.  Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 
(1994).  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
relied upon the specific protocol Washington had 
adopted, which was based on scientific study and 
expert analysis undertaken to minimize the risk of an 
inhumane death by hanging.  Campbell, 18 F. 3d at 
687.  In spite of the judicial position on hanging, 
greater public awareness and deliberation as to the 
continuing risk of unnecessary pain and brutality of 
hanging caused Washington State to adopt lethal 
injection as its default method of execution in 1996.4   
Electrocution.  Although Washington was slow to 
move away from hanging (a pace likely explained in 
part by the fact that Washington did not execute 
anyone for three decades preceding 1993),5 many 
States had moved to a new method of execution at the 
turn of the century.  By 1915, twelve States had 
switched from hanging to electrocution, in reliance 
upon the “belief that electrocution is less painful and 
more humane than hanging.”  Malloy v. South 
Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).  Throughout the 
early part of the twentieth century, the vast majority 
of States turned to the electric chair as the preferred 
method of execution. See Campbell, 18 F.3d at app. B 
726-29; Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 130 tbl. 2.   
                                           
4 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.180(1) (requiring lethal 
injection unless the inmate elects hanging); see also Denno, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. at app. 2 at 205-06. 
5 Persons Executed Since 1904 in Washington State, WASH. 
STATE DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.wa.gov/offender 
info/capitalpunishment/executedlist.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
7 
The change from hanging to electrocution began in 
New York in the late 1800s, when members of the New 
York legislature began investigating the use of elec-
tricity in executions.  BANNER, supra, at 178; In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444.  At that time, the electric 
chair was viewed as a modern method of execution 
and, through the use of technology, able to cause a 
quick and painless death.  See NEW YORK (STATE) 
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE MOST 
HUMANE AND PRACTICAL METHOD OF CARRYING INTO 
EFFECT THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IN CAPITAL CASES, 
80 (1888).   
New York adopted electrocution on the premise that 
it presented a more humane method of execution even 
though no inmate had ever been executed by the 
electric chair and thus New York lacked any evidence 
of how the method would work in practice.  Denno, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. at 71-74; see generally Deborah W. 
Denno, Is Electrocution An Unconstitutional Method of 
Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the 
Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994).  Indeed, 
the electric chair did not even exist at the time New 
York switched to the method and “[p]rison officials . . . 
faced the task of acquiring machinery that had not yet 
been designed.”  BANNER, supra, at 181; see id. at 182. 
In 1890, this Court permitted the first execution 
by electric chair to proceed, relying on New York’s 
expressed motivation of finding a more humane 
method of execution. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447-
49.  New York’s execution of Kemmler in 1890 was 
plagued with serious problems, but that did not deter 
other States from adopting the method.  BANNER, 
supra, at 186, 189; Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 71-74 & 
n.55.  By 1930, more than half of the then-active death 
8 
penalty States employed the electric chair.  See 
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 15 (1991); Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 130 tbl. 
2.  As States continued to copy New York’s method, 
“prison officials from the later states to adopt the chair 
traveled to the earlier states to learn how to construct 
and operate the necessary equipment.”  BANNER, 
supra, at 190.  But the problems of New York’s first-
time use of the electric chair persisted, with widely 
reported accounts of gruesomely botched electro-
cutions over the years.  See Deborah W. Denno, Getting 
to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. 
REV. 319, app. 2.A at 413 (1997) (describing examples 
of botched executions); BANNER, supra, at 192-193.   
Following a particularly gruesome electrocution in 
Florida, this Court agreed to examine the consti-
tutionality of electrocution in the State.  See Bryan v. 
Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999).  By that time, public 
awareness of the risk that electrocutions would cause 
unnecessary pain and lingering death had reached a 
high point.6  In early 2000, the Florida legislature 
altered its execution method to permit an inmate to 
choose between electrocution and lethal injection.  See 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 922.105; 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 
Ch. 2000-2 (West).  As a result, the Court dismissed 
the writ as improvidently granted.  Bryan v. Moore, 
528 U.S. 1133 (2000) (dismissing writ in light of 
“recent amendments” to the Florida statute).   
                                           
6 See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How 
Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
49, 63 (2007) (describing the 1999 botched execution of Allen Lee 
Davis, who suffered deep burns and bleeding, color photographs 
of which were viewed by millions of people on the Florida 
Supreme Court’s website); Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 78-79. 
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In the following years, two state courts ruled 
electrocution unconstitutional under state constitu-
tions.  In 2001, Georgia held electrocution unconstitu-
tional, explaining “whether a particular punishment is 
cruel and unusual is not a static concept, but instead 
changes in recognition of the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  
Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Georgia 
legislature had abolished electrocution as a method of 
execution for capital offenses committed after May 1, 
2000, “reflect[ing] societal consensus that the ‘science 
of the present day’ has provided a less painful, less 
barbarous means for taking the life of condemned 
prisoners.”  Id. at 144 (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 
at 444).  The Nebraska Supreme Court held electro-
cution unconstitutional under the Nebraska State 
Constitution in 2008, reasoning that “[e]lectrocution’s 
proven history of burning and charring bodies is 
inconsistent with both the concepts of evolving 
standards of decency and the dignity of man.”  State v. 
Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (Neb. 2008).  The 
Nebraska Supreme Court further explained that 
States that already had abolished electrocution 
through legislative process “have recognized that early 
assumptions about an instantaneous and painless 
death were simply incorrect and that there are more 
humane methods of carrying out the death penalty.”  
Id.  
Lethal Gas.  Not all States initially turned to 
electrocution as an alternative to hanging, however.  
Early problems with electrocution together with the 
continued repugnant nature of hangings caused some 
States to experiment with the gas chamber.  Nevada, 
which had never adopted electrocution, was the first 
State to authorize lethal gas in 1921.  Denno, 63 OHIO 
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ST. L.J. at 83.  At the time, Nevada’s deputy attorney 
general persuaded two state legislators that the 
method would be more humane than hanging or the 
firing squad.  BANNER, supra, at 196.  “Within a week, 
apparently without any debate in either house of the 
legislature, both houses passed a bill providing for 
execution by lethal gas.”  Id.  The legislature explained 
that the switch to lethal gas “sought to provide a 
method of inflicting the death penalty in the most 
humane manner known to modern science.” State v. 
Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682 (Nev. 1923).  By 1955, ten 
additional States had adopted lethal gas.  Denno, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. at 83. 
Nevada initially sought to rely on lethal gas because 
it was the method used in the relatively peaceful 
killings of animals.  See Gee Jon, 211 P. at 681.  But, 
again, prison officials were tasked with figuring out 
the details of exactly how to carry out the method on 
human beings.  BANNER, supra, at 197.  As with prior 
execution methods, the first lethal gas execution did 
not go as planned and the hydrocyanic acid prison 
officials had chosen to use pooled on the floor of the gas 
chamber.  Id. at 197-98.  Over time, it became clear 
that inmates did not die peacefully by breathing in 
lethal gas while sleeping.  Death lingered and inmates 
often urinated on themselves, moaned, twitched, and 
painfully convulsed for minutes before finally dying.7  
In addition, the gas chamber carried with it lasting 
association with the abhorrent mass killings in Nazi 
Germany.  Allen Huang, Hanging, Cyanide Gas, and 
the Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ninth 
Circuit’s Misapplication of the Cruel and Unusual 
                                           
7 See, e.g., Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 
1983); see also Denno, 82 IOWA L. REV. at app. 2.B at 425. 
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 74 OR. L. REV. 995, 
1007-08 (1995).  The gas chamber fell out of favor. 
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that execution by 
lethal gas under California’s protocol constituted  
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment and deemed the method 
unconstitutional.  Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th 
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 519 U.S. 
918 (1996).  The Ninth Circuit cited to the district 
court’s findings that the evidence indicated inmates 
would experience extreme pain.  Id. at 308-09.  This 
Court avoided consideration of the constitutionality of 
the method when California (which allowed for a 
choice between lethal gas and lethal injection) 
amended its method of execution statute to set lethal 
injection as the default method unless the inmate 
chose lethal gas; the Ninth Circuit agreed on remand 
that the inmate no longer had standing to challenge 
the constitutionality of California’s method of 
execution.  See Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158, 1160 
(9th Cir. 1998).  In Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 
(1999), the Court held that a death row inmate had 
waived his claim that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited his execution by lethal gas because the 
inmate specifically had chosen to be executed by lethal 
gas rather than lethal injection.  526 U.S. at 118-19. 
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II. IN SWITCHING TO LETHAL INJECTION, 
LEGISLATURES DELEGATED IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE METHOD TO 
PRISON OFFICIALS WHO ADOPTED 
PROCEDURES WITHOUT MEDICAL 
STUDY OR MEANINGFUL ANALYSIS. 
Public scrutiny of methods of execution intensified 
in the 1970s following the end of a nine-year  
execution hiatus while this Court considered the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.  At that time, 
States turned to lethal injection, with Oklahoma 
leading the way.  While Oklahoma touted the 
humaneness of the method, no evidence existed to 
support this conclusion.  Oklahoma delegated the 
actual details of implementing the method to its 
department of corrections, which devised a three-drug 
protocol.  States and the federal government followed 
suit in adopting lethal injection as a method of 
execution, in delegating responsibility for the 
development of specific protocols to prison officials, 
and in utilizing the same three-drug protocol.  While 
the original three-drug protocol was commonplace for 
decades, more States have modified the drugs used in 
their execution protocols in the past seven years than 
at any point since the method’s adoption. 
A. The Development Of Lethal Injection 
Protocols Lacked Any Reasoned 
Consideration. 
1. Oklahoma’s Adoption Of Lethal Injection 
As this Court has recognized, “state legislatures 
began responding to public calls to reexamine elec-
trocution as a means of ensuring a humane death” 
following the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428  
13 
U.S. 153 (1976).  Baze, 553 U.S. at 41-42 (citing 
BANNER, supra, at 192-93, 296-97). Oklahoma, facing 
the need to refurbish its rotting electric chair, turned 
to lethal injection.8  Oklahoma introduced the first 
lethal injection bill in 1977.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 41-42; 
BANNER, supra, at 297; Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 
F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).  Two Oklahoma state 
legislators, State Representative Bill Wiseman and 
State Senator Bill Dawson, spearheaded the move 
toward lethal injection, driven by the inhumanity of 
electrocution and the costs associated with it.9  
Because the Oklahoma Medical Association refused 
to assist with devising the new method of execution, 
Wiseman and Dawson consulted with A. Jay Chap-
man, Oklahoma’s chief medical examiner.  Deborah W. 
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine 
Has Dismantled The Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 49, 65-66 (2007).  Chapman agreed to assist  
the legislators even though he admitted he “‘was an 
expert in dead bodies but not an expert in getting them 
that way.’”  Id. at 66.  Chapman quickly proposed use 
of an intravenous drip of “an ultra-short-acting 
barbiturate,” which would cause unconsciousness, “in 
combination with a chemical paralytic,” to paralyze 
                                           
8 BANNER, supra, at 296.  Oklahoma had adopted lethal gas as 
an execution method in 1951, but provided that electrocution 
would be used until the State could build a gas chamber, which it 
never did.  See Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at app. 2 at 201 n.121.  
Construction of the gas chamber was estimated to cost at least 
$250,000 and fixing the State’s electric chair was estimated to 
cost $50,000.  Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 71.   
9 See Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 65-66, 71; Tim Barker, 
Author of Lethal Injection Bill Recalls His Motive, TULSA  
WORLD, Sept. 7, 1990, at A1, available at http://www.tulsa 
world.com/archives/author-of-lethal-injection-bill-recalls-his-motiv 
e/article_90c3f8c3-22c5-5cd7-8d0c-42fb17378968.html. 
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the body’s muscles.  Id. at 66-67; see also William  
J. Wiseman, Confessions of a Former Legislator, 
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 20-27, 2001, at 6.  According 
to Chapman, he specifically suggested to the legisla-
tors certain drugs for use: sodium thiopental as the 
ultra-short-acting barbiturate and chloral hydrate as 
the paralytic agent.  Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 67. 
Dawson also sought input from Stanley Deutsch, the 
head of the Oklahoma Medical School’s Anesthesiol-
ogy Department, in a single phone call.  Id. at 67-68; 
see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 42.  After the call, Deutsch 
sent a letter recommending two types of drugs:  an 
“ultra short acting barbiturate” and a “neuromuscular 
blocking drug.”  Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 67.  
The proposed bill in the Oklahoma legislature did 
not include specific drugs or doses based on the input 
of either Chapman or Deutsch.  Id.  No historical 
evidence suggests any further consultation with 
doctors or scientists, nor any study or consideration of 
any of available evidence concerning the risks and 
dangers of lethal injection.  Id. at 65, 70.   
The Oklahoma lethal injection bill introduced in 
early 1977 tracked Chapman’s early formulation.  An 
Act Relating to Criminal Procedure; Amending 22 O.S. 
1971, Section 1014; and Specifying the Manner of 
Inflicting Punishment of Death; and Making Provi-
sions Separable, S.B. 10, 36th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 
1977).  The bill passed, and was signed into law on 
May 10, 1977, making Oklahoma the first state to 
authorize execution by lethal injection. Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 22, § 1014. 
The language included in Oklahoma’s statute, 
however, was intentionally vague and delegated to 
prison officials authority to determine how to carry out 
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lethal injections.  Id.  Corrections officials had the 
responsibility for determining what drugs to use, what 
dosage to give, and who would administer the drugs 
and how.  See Denno, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at 68-69.  
Despite his admitted lack of expertise, Chapman again 
played a key role in assisting officials in developing the 
details of a lethal injection procedure.  Denno, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. at 73-75.  In light of his role as the 
medical examiner, it was perhaps unsurprising that 
Chapman was unconcerned with whether the specific 
protocol would inflict pain and suffering.  Rather, 
when asked for the rationale behind his ultimate 
recommendation of specific drugs, he ridiculed the 
idea that “we should worry that these horses’ patoots 
should have a bit of pain, awareness of anything.”  Id. 
at 74 n.151.   
During Chapman’s consultation with the depart-
ment of corrections behind the scenes, the third drug, 
potassium chloride, was added to the two-drug 
combination. Id. at 74.  Potassium chloride works  
in humans to stop the heart, and if an inmate is  
not sufficiently anesthetized before receiving the  
drug, it is undisputed that it will cause “a conscious 
inmate to suffer excruciating pain.”  Baze, 553 U.S.  
at 113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Moreover, the 
second drug—the paralytic agent—would mask the 
expression of any pain.  See id. at 71 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. at 55-56; Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy 
and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C.L. REV. 
1367, 1377 (2014).  In selecting these drugs at the 
time, prison officials in Oklahoma stated that “if and 
when they have to use the injection law, new and 
better drugs may be available.”  Deborah W. Denno, 
Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 
1357-60 (2014) (emphasis omitted). 
16 
2. Widespread Adoption Of The Three-Drug 
Protocol  
Beginning immediately after Oklahoma adopted 
lethal injection, other States switched to the method, 
before the method ever had been used in an execution.  
Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Texas adopted lethal injection the very 
next day.  Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 78.  By 1982, 
the year in which Texas conducted the first lethal 
injection execution, six States had enacted lethal 
injection statutes.  Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1341 cht. 
1.  Another fifteen States adopted lethal injection from 
1983 to 1988, with seven States doing so in 1983.   
Id.  That progression continued, with twelve States 
switching to lethal injection from 1994 to 2002.  Id.; 
see also Denno, 82 IOWA L. REV. at 408 tbl. 7, app. 3 at 
439; Snell, supra n.2, at 4, 7 tbl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3596(a).  
Nebraska abandoned electrocution in favor of lethal 
injection only in 2009 after the Nebraska Supreme 
Court found the electric chair unconstitutional under 
the state constitution.  Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1342. 
Like Oklahoma, other States left their lethal 
injection statutes intentionally vague.  See Denno, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. at 68-69; Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.  
at 93.  This delegation left the responsibility for 
developing execution protocols to corrections officials 
who had no specialized expertise.  Prison officials thus 
had “unfettered discretion to determine all protocol 
and procedures, most notably the chemicals to be used, 
for a state execution.”  Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 
854 (Ark. 2012) (discussing Arkansas statute). 
Ultimately, the federal government and almost 
every State that adopted lethal injection as an execu-
tion method also adopted the original three-drug 
protocol that Oklahoma had developed.  Baze, 553 U.S. 
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at 43 (noting at least 30 States use the three-drug 
combination); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 76-77 & 
n.17 (Md. 2006) (similar).  But, as this Court recognized, 
“it is undisputed that the States using lethal injection 
adopted the protocol first developed by Oklahoma 
without significant independent review of the 
procedure.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 44 n.1; see also 
Beardslee, 395 F.3d at 1074 n.11 (noting California’s 
protocol was “informally” based on the protocol in 
Texas and that “the precise protocol was never 
subjected to the rigors of scientific analysis.”). 
States copied the three-drug protocol despite the 
concerns that arose about it almost immediately.  Soon 
after Oklahoma adopted the method, Chapman, 
Oklahoma’s medical examiner, publicly discussed its 
potential dangers. See Jim Killackey, Execution Drug 
Like Anesthesia, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 12, 1977, at 
1 (“Dr. A. Jay Chapman, state medical examiner, said 
that if the death-dealing drug is not administered 
properly, the convict may not die and could be 
subjected to severe muscle pain.”).  When Texas 
became the first State to employ the method in 1982, 
the Texas warden mistakenly mixed all three drugs 
into a single syringe, causing the mixture to turn into 
“white sludge.”  See STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE 
EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT INDUSTRY 74-75 (1992).   
Indeed, the dangers attendant to the particular 
sequence of drugs were foreseeable even in 1977.  See, 
e.g., Simon Berlyn, Execution By the Needle, NEW 
SCIENTIST, Sept. 15, 1977, at 676-77 (describing the 
likely dangers of pairing a fast-acting barbiturate with 
a chemical paralytic, including the “terrifying possibility 
. . . that if an insufficient dose of barbiturates were 
given in execution,” together with a paralytic, “a 
conscious victim would be unable to convey an 
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experience of intense suffering”). And before 
Oklahoma considered the method, Great Britain’s 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment had issued 
a 1953 report that concluded after a five-year study 
that lethal injection brought with it serious risks, 
ranging from the likely necessity of medical 
involvement to the potential difficulties of injecting an 
inmate with compromised veins.  ROYAL COMMISSION 
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT 257-61 
(1953); Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 64-65. 
In the quarter-century that followed the first lethal 
injection execution, state prison officials continued to 
use the same lethal injection method, which resulted 
in numerous botched executions.  Officials stabbed at 
inmates, trying to find suitable veins; intravenous 
lines infiltrated, sending the lethal chemicals into the 
tissue instead of the bloodstream; and inmates gasped 
and convulsed, apparently in pain. See, e.g., Denno, 63 
OHIO ST. L.J. at app. 1 at 139-41 tbl. 9; Denno, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. at 100-01. 
B. State Prison Officials Continue To 
Follow The Same Historical Pattern In 
Relying Upon Insufficient Scientific 
And Medical Study In Modifying Lethal 
Injection Protocols. 
Although nearly all States relied on the original 
three-drug sequence of sodium thiopental, pancu-
ronium bromide, and potassium chloride at the time 
this Court agreed to hear Baze, that no longer is true 
today.  Despite the Court’s sanctioning of Kentucky’s 
three-drug protocol, States have moved away from the 
three-drug combination in recent years.  Such changes 
resulted from either court intervention or practical 
considerations as opposed to medical or scientific 
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study.  Regardless of why any single State modified its 
protocol, other States often copied the new approach. 
1. The Use Of A One-Drug Protocol 
When this Court agreed to hear Baze in 2007, many 
States were grappling with challenges to lethal injec-
tion protocols.  In California, for instance, a federal 
district court ruled in 2006 that the State could not 
carry out the execution of inmate Michael Morales 
using its standard three-drug protocol unless it 
provided qualified medical personnel in the field of 
general anesthesia to ensure that Morales was 
unconscious.  See Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 
1037, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 438 
F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006).  As an alternative, the district 
court ruled that the execution could proceed if the 
State traded the historical three-drug protocol for a 
barbiturate-only protocol.  Id.  The State selected the 
alternative after the anesthesiologists scheduled to 
participate in the execution withdrew, but the State 
was unable to devise a one-drug protocol in time.10  
Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974-77 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
The following year, in September 2007, a federal 
district court in Tennessee deemed Tennessee’s lethal 
                                           
10 The same district court ruled in 2010 that California could 
use the one-drug protocol to execute inmate Albert Greenwood 
Brown, although that execution did not go forward.  Morales v. 
Cate, Nos. 3:06-cv-00219, 3:06-cv-00926, 2010 WL 3751757, at *6-
7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2010) (providing for one-drug protocol); Cal. 
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. v. Superior Ct. of Marin Cnty., 
No. A129540, 2010 WL 3621873 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2010) 
(unpublished); Jack Leonard & Maura Dolan, California Calls 
Off Brown Execution, LOS ANGELES TIMES, http://latimesblogs.la 
times.com/lanow/2010/09/california-calls-off-brown-execution.html 
(Sept. 29, 2010 4:25 p.m.). 
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injection protocol, adopted after a 90-day moratorium, 
unconstitutional.  Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 
872 (M.D. Tenn. 2007), rev’d, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 
2009).  The panel constituted to evaluate Tennessee’s 
lethal injection protocol had recommended that the 
State switch to a one-drug protocol that embodied 
fewer inherent risks.  Id. at 877-78.  But the Tennessee 
commissioner of corrections decided to retain the 
three-drug method.  Id. at 886.  In doing so, the 
commissioner declined to include any of the additional 
safeguards the panel had recommended.  Id. 
These decisions, however, pre-dated this Court’s 
decision in Baze, which approved the three-drug 
method.  Instead of fortifying the three-drug cocktail, 
however, States began to move toward a one-drug 
method that the petitioners in Baze had advanced and 
which the courts in California and Tennessee had 
approved.11   
In switching to a one-drug protocol, States this time 
followed Ohio.  In June 2008, less than two months 
after Baze was decided, a state court held that Ohio 
could no longer employ the standard three-drug 
protocol because the drug combination contravened 
Ohio’s own lethal injection statute and therefore vio-
lated due process.  State v. Rivera, No. 04CR065940, 
2008 WL 2784679, slip op. at 1, 9 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
June 10, 2008).  The Ohio court emphasized that “the 
use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol (pancu-
ronium bromide and potassium chloride) creates an 
unnecessary and arbitrary risk that the condemned 
                                           
11 In addition, four states have abolished the death penalty 
since 2008.  See Denno, 102 GEO. L. J. at 1343 n.73.  New Mexico, 
Connecticut, and Maryland did not make the abolishment of the 
death penalty retroactive.  Id. 
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will experience an agonizing and painful death.”  Id. 
at 6.  The court proceeded to hold that the State’s 
implementation of lethal injection should be through 
only “a lethal injection of a single, anesthetic drug.”  
Id. at 9. 
Ohio officially adopted a one-drug protocol using 
only sodium thiopental in 2009.12  Prison officials in 
other States quickly followed suit, although many 
executions ended up using pentobarbital as a 
substitute for sodium thiopental.  Denno, 102 GEO. 
L.J. at 1357-60.  Washington State switched to the 
one-drug method in 2010, as did South Dakota in 
2011.  Id. at 1357-60.  In 2012, another five states 
(Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, and Texas) made 
the change and three states did so in 2013 (Arkansas, 
Kentucky, and Louisiana).  Id.  By 2013, prison 
officials in one-third of death penalty States had 
abandoned the three-drug sequence.  Id. at 1360.  
Kentucky joined this group even though this Court 
had specifically rejected the argument in Baze that 
Kentucky should switch to a one-drug protocol, noting 
that using a single barbiturate was a method that 
“ha[d] not been adopted by any State and ha[d] never 
been tried.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 40.   
With so many States abandoning the three-drug 
protocol, “[i]n 2013, two-thirds of the lethal injection 
executions used a one-drug protocol compared to one-
half of the lethal injection executions in 2012.”  Denno, 
102 GEO. L.J. at 1360.  States have continued to move 
                                           
12 Ohio also permitted use of an alternative two-drug sequence 
that it implemented in 2014 in the execution of Dennis McGuire.  
Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1357; Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1387. 
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to a one-drug protocol in increasing numbers. 13  See 
State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-
injection (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).   
2. A Shift In The Drugs Used 
At the same time certain States turned to the one-
drug method, other States maintained rigid adherence 
to a three-drug protocol.  All States began modifying 
the precise drugs used, however, due to pragmatic 
considerations. 
Because of drug shortages, prison officials were 
forced to make substitutions for the first drug from 
the original three-drug sequence, sodium thiopental, 
in both one-drug and three-drug protocols.  Denno, 
102 GEO L.J. at 1362.  “In 2009, the last domestic 
manufacturer of thiopental stopped making it.”  Cook 
v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  Foreign 
manufacturers, aware of the use of the drug in lethal 
injections, declined to export the drug to the United 
States.  Denno, 102 GEO L.J. at 1360-61, 1363-65.  As 
a result, corrections officials sought out both 
alternative sources for sodium thiopental and 
substitutes for the drug. 
Oklahoma made such a substitution in 2010.  That 
year, when it could not obtain the sodium thiopental 
long used as the first drug in the sequence, Oklahoma 
became the first State to use pentobarbital, a drug  
 
                                           
13 See also Robinson v. Shanahan, 755 S.E.2d 398, 398-99 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2014); Maura Dolan, California Will No Longer  
Pursue Three-Drug Lethal Injections, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/10/local/la-me-ln-lethal-inject 
ion-20130710 (Jul. 10, 2013).  
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used as a sedative or to control convulsions.  Denno, 
102 GEO. L.J. at 1362; Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 
1340-41 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting challenge to 
substitution of pentobarbital as the first drug in the 
protocol).  Other States also switched, at least tem-
porarily, to the drug.  Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1358 
cht. 3.  By 2011, prison officials in thirteen States 
again had followed Oklahoma’s lead and permitted the 
use of pentobarbital.  Id.   
But when the availability of pentobarbital became 
questionable, prison officials turned to compounding 
pharmacies to obtain it—a type of pharmacy 
unregulated by the Food and Drug Administration. Id. 
at 1364-71; see also In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 892, 
895-97 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (rejecting challenge to 
pentobarbital from compounding pharmacy), reh’g 
denied, 741 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 
S.Ct. 1790 (2014); Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 
465, 468 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom., Yowell 
v. Livingston, 134 S. Ct. 417 (2013) (same); Wellons v. 
Comm’r Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (same); Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1381.  
Compounded pentobarbital presented the additional 
risk of drug contamination, which can cause 
excruciating pain.  Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1382-85; 
Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1370-71, 1378-79 & n.329.  
The risks associated with the modified approach 
materialized in Oklahoma’s problematic execution of 
Michael Lee Wilson in January 2014.  Berger, 55 
B.C.L. REV. at 1385 (describing witness accounts that 
Wilson cried out during his execution, “I feel my whole 
body burning!”).   
Correction officials in a handful of States now have 
turned to midazolam as a substitute for sodium 
thiopental.  See, e.g., Muhammad v. State, 132 So.3d 
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176, 188 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 894 (2014) 
(Florida); Arthur v. Thomas, No. 2:11-cv-438, 2015 WL 
224738, at *1-2 & n.1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2015) 
(Alabama).  In 2014, four States conducted executions 
using midazolam, with two States using the drug in a 
three-drug protocol and the other two States using it 
as part of a two-drug protocol.  See Execution List 
2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2015); see also In re Ohio Execution Protocol 
Litig., 994 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
(addressing Ohio’s use of midazolam in two-drug 
protocol); Order, Wood v. Ryan, No. 2:14-cv-01447-
NVW (D. Ariz. July 24, 2014), ECF No. 34 (discussing 
execution of Joseph Rudolph Wood). 
Again, Oklahoma is one of these States.  After the 
botched execution of Michael Lee Wilson in January 
2014 using pentobarbital from a compounding 
pharmacy, Oklahoma substituted midazolam as the 
first drug in the three-drug sequence for the exe- 
cution of Clayton Lockett in April 2014.14  Berger, 55 
B.C.L. REV. at 1386; Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 
725 (10th Cir. 2015).  Lockett’s execution was filled 
with egregious errors, including the inability to 
establish a reliable intravenous line.  See Warner, 776 
F.3d at 725.  Although a doctor had declared Lockett 
unconscious, he apparently awoke at some point.  See 
id.; OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE EXECUTION OF 
CLAYTON D. LOCKETT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 (2014) 
(hereinafter “Lockett Execution Report”), available at 
http:// www.dps.state.ok.us/Investigation/14-0189SI%20 
Summary.pdf.  Witnesses described Lockett as twitching, 
                                           
14 Oklahoma’s revised protocol provides four drug combina-
tions, two of which called for large doses of a single barbiturate—
either pentobarbital or sodium thiopental.  Warner v. Gross, 776 
F.3d 721, 726 (10th Cir. 2015).   
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gasping, convulsing violently, and calling out.  Berger, 
55 B.C.L. REV. at 1386.  Prison officials discovered that 
the intravenous line had not worked as intended and 
some of the drugs had absorbed into Lockett’s tissue 
or leaked out.  See id.; Locket Execution Report at 11-
12, 18-19; Warner, 776 F.3d at 725.  State officials 
attempted to stop the execution, but Lockett died 
forty-three minutes after the first injection.  See 
Lockett Execution Report at 18; Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. 
at 1386; Warner, 776 F.3d at 725.  Oklahoma 
investigated the botched execution, but still 
maintained the use of midazolam even though the 
drug does not have the same anesthetic properties as 
sodium thiopental.  Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1386; 
Pet. Br. 19-22. 
As a result of a flurry of changes to execution 
protocols, prison officials used four different drug 
combinations in lethal injection executions in 2014 
alone.15  The quick switches to new drugs stand in 
stark contrast to the consensus in support of the three-
drug protocol at issue in Baze, which States had relied 
upon for more than thirty years. 
 
 
 
                                           
15 See Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2015).  The four drug combinations were: (1) a three-
drug protocol using midazolam; (2) a three-drug protocol using 
pentobarbital; (3) a two-drug protocol using midazolam and 
hydromorphone; and (4) a one-drug protocol using pentobarbital.  
Id. 
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III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PRISON OFFI-
CIALS’ ADMINISTRATION OF LETHAL 
INJECTION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT. 
As the history demonstrates, States adopted lethal 
injection generally and the three-drug protocol 
specifically without serious study or independent 
analysis. States uniformly followed Oklahoma in 
delegating to prison officials the details of lethal 
injections.  Historical practice and contemporary 
evidence indicate that prison officials likely lack the 
necessary expertise to develop lethal injection 
protocols and fail to rely upon scientific or medical 
study.  Yet these prison officials, operating outside the 
public eye, are tasked with developing procedures by 
which inmates will be executed.  Because legislatures 
have delegated responsibility for such protocols to 
unelected officials, it is imperative that courts not 
insulate a State’s protocol against challenge.  Rather, 
the judiciary must provide a check on the exercise of 
such authority.   In light of the recent trend toward 
constantly changing protocols, the courts have the 
constitutional responsibility to ensure such 
procedures comport with the Eighth Amendment. 
A. Judicial Examination Of Modifications 
To Protocols Is Necessary Because The 
Actions Of Prison Officials Are Not 
Subject To Public Scrutiny And 
Oversight. 
For a quarter century, States followed the three-
drug protocol this Court approved in Baze.  But prison 
officials did not arrive at the three-drug protocol  
after independent analysis and evaluation.  Rather, 
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the protocol was “the product of administrative 
convenience and a stereotyped reaction to an issue, 
rather than a careful analysis of relevant 
considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion.”  
Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In fact, 
“[i]n the majority of States that use the three-drug 
protocol, the drugs were selected by unelected depart-
ment of correction officials with no specialized medical 
knowledge and without the benefit of expert assis-
tance or guidance.”  Id. at 74-75. 
Following Baze, States “have changed their lethal 
injection protocols in inconsistent ways that bear little 
resemblance to the original protocol evaluated in Baze 
and even differ from one execution to the next within 
the same state.”  Denno, 102 GEO. L.J. at 1331.  Rather 
than correct for the unreasoned manner in which 
protocols had been adopted in the past, however, 
officials prioritize concern for administrative conven-
ience over the need for a humane execution.  Thus, as 
with the original three-drug protocol, such changes are 
not the result of careful deliberation.  For this reason, 
“their drug selections are not entitled to the kind of 
deference afforded legislative decisions.”  Baze, 553 
U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  
Prison officials in Oklahoma fall into this general 
pattern.  Oklahoma first adopted pentobarbital for 
executions without any reasoned analysis.  Pavatt, 627 
F.3d at 1337; Pet. Br. at 11.  Oklahoma then used 
pentobarbital from a compounding pharmacy, despite 
the well-documented risks associated with such 
pharmacies.  Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1385.  When 
pentobarbital became unavailable, Oklahoma prison 
officials turned to midazolam because Florida had  
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used the drug.  Pet. Br. at 11.  Oklahoma’s reliance on 
another State’s protocol without independent evalua-
tion mirrored other States’ adoption of Oklahoma’s 
three-drug protocol nearly four decades ago.   
Under these circumstances, judicial review provides 
a necessary means by which to examine the consti-
tutionality of the chosen lethal injection drugs, 
procedures, and administration.  See, e.g., Morales, 
465 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (holding California’s protocol 
unconstitutional); Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 895, 
903 (ruling State’s failure to adopt one-drug protocol 
recommend by state-commissioned study violated the 
Eighth Amendment); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 2:07-cv-
04129, 2006 WL 1779035, at *8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 
2006), rev’d, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding 
that Missouri’s lethal injection procedure presented 
unconstitutional risk due to maladministration).   
Following Baze, however, challenges to lethal injec-
tion protocols were cut short in misplaced reliance on 
the decision.  Indeed, a majority of the cases cite the 
“Baze substantial-risk standard to establish that the 
method of injection and the drugs administered did 
not pose a risk sufficient to constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation.”  Denno, 102 GEO L.J. at 1349.  
Reliance on this aspect of Baze persisted in spite of 
numerous changes to lethal injection protocols.  Id.   
But the plurality opinion in Baze did not seek to 
insulate lethal injection protocols from scrutiny.  Baze, 
553 U.S. at 62.  The opinion specifically contemplated 
changes to the method “in light of new developments, 
to ensure humane capital punishment.”  Id.   
Although the Court anticipated legislative changes, 
Baze, 553 U.S. at 62, the types of challenges at issue  
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in Baze (concerning the risk of improper admin-
istration) and here (concerning drug selection) do not 
involve matters on which legislatures historically have 
spoken.  While the courts need not serve as “boards of 
inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for 
executions,” id. at 51 (plurality op.), each new com-
bination of drugs must be evaluated independently.   
Such judicial oversight would not “substantially 
intrude on the role of state legislatures in implement-
ing their execution procedures,” id., because legisla-
tures do not concern themselves with the intricacies of 
lethal injection procedures.16  Thus, as Justice Stevens 
explained, “[t]he question whether a similar three-
drug protocol may be used in other States remains 
open, and may well be answered differently in a future 
case on the basis of a more complete record.”  Id. at 71 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).   
The development of such records is critical.  History 
demonstrates that the lethal injection protocols that 
                                           
16 Recently, legislatures that have proposed bills addressing 
execution methods have sought to bring back methods of 
execution abandoned in favor of lethal injection.  Oklahoma is 
considering a bill that would revive a modified form of lethal gas 
using nitrogen instead of cyanide.  See, e.g., Sean Murphy, 
Nitrogen Gas Executions Approved By Oklahoma, ABC NEWS, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/nitrogen-gas-executions-ap 
proved-oklahoma-house-29354885 (Mar. 3, 2015 4:14 p.m.).  The 
Utah Senate approved a statutory amendment that would allow 
the State to use the firing squad if the State cannot obtain lethal 
injection drugs.  Kelly Catalfamo & Michelle L. Price, Utah 
Lawmakers Vote to Allow Firing Squad, ABC NEWS, http:// 
abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/lawmakers-vote-state-firing-squad- 
29542718 (Mar. 11, 2015 12:48 a.m.).  And Tennessee amended 
its statute to allow for the use of electrocution if the drugs for 
lethal injection are not available.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-23-
114(e)(2). 
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prison officials created embodied constitutionally 
unacceptable risks.  Even when faced with evidence of 
botched executions involving the exact same combina-
tion of drugs, States have proceeded to use the 
protocol.  Closer examination of such procedures was 
(and remains) hindered and, in some cases, foreclosed 
by the secretive nature in which prison officials 
develop and ultimately carry out their lethal injection 
protocols.  Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. at 121-23; 
Berger, 55 B.C.L. REV. at 1388-95.  Thoughtful 
examination will continue only if this Court reinforces 
the necessity of Eighth Amendment review of prison 
officials’ chosen lethal injection drugs and procedures. 
B. The Delegation Of Lethal Injection 
Procedures To Prison Officials Permits 
Corrective Revision Of Protocols To 
Ensure Compliance With The Eighth 
Amendment. 
Although the delegation to prison officials of the 
details of lethal injection means that protocols require 
careful judicial scrutiny, such delegation also provides 
States with the flexibility to adjust protocols if a court 
deems an aspect unconstitutional.  Thus, no reason 
exists to require an inmate to identify a specific 
alternative to a challenged protocol.  To the contrary, 
legislatures and courts should not be permitted to 
transfer the responsibility for an execution that 
comports with the Eighth Amendment to the 
condemned inmate. 
When Oklahoma first declined to include the details 
of the protocol in its lethal injection statute in 1977, it 
did so with the idea that different drug combinations 
might become available.  Denno, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
at 67.   
In recent years, this remnant of the adoption of 
lethal injection has permitted inmates to challenge the 
specific lethal injection procedures promulgated by 
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prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
governs challenges to circumstances of confinement.  
In such actions, a ruling deeming a protocol uncon-
stitutional would not render lethal injection itself 
unconstitutional because States’ lethal injection stat-
utes do not embody the specifics of lethal injection 
procedures.   
In Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004), this 
Court permitted to proceed as a Section 1983 claim a 
challenge by a condemned inmate to the planned use 
of a cut-down procedure—a painful and invasive way 
to establish intravenous access. Id. at 642-46.  The 
Court explained the suit was allowed because the 
petitioner did not seek to challenge lethal injection 
itself, but rather challenged only the cut-down 
procedure.  Id.   
Two year later, in Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 
(2006), the petitioner inmate challenged the constitu-
tionality of Florida’s three-drug protocol.  The Court 
held that challenges to state protocols were permissi-
ble Section 1983 actions because success “would not 
necessarily prevent the State from executing [the 
inmate] by lethal injection.”  Id. at 580.   
And Baze concerned whether the non-drug aspects 
of Kentucky’s protocol presented an unnecessary risk 
of pain and suffering if the three-drug protocol were 
not administered properly.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 40 
(explaining that petitioners contended only that 
Kentucky’s protocol violated the Eight Amendment 
“because of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not 
be properly followed, resulting in significant pain”). 
In this regard, because legislatures delegate to 
prison officials the details of lethal injection execu-
tions, a State retains the flexibility to implement an 
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alternative to its chosen procedure if needed.17  State 
corrections officials have demonstrated over time the 
ability to respond to a variety of practical concerns and 
have the same ability to respond to constitutional 
concerns if required to do so.  See Hill, 547 U.S. at 580-
81 (explaining that Florida “leaves implementation [of 
lethal injection] to the department of corrections,” and 
“does not require the department of corrections to use 
the challenged procedure,” thereby “leav[ing] the State 
free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure”) 
(citing Fla. Stat. §§ 922.105(1), (7)); see also Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 213 (2007) (describing Hill as 
“unanimously reject[ing] a proposal that § 1983 suits 
challenging a method of execution must identify an 
acceptable alternative”). 
In this way, the intentional vagueness of lethal 
injection statutes allows prison officials to take 
corrective action if a certain protocol is found 
unconstitutional.  Accordingly, challenges to lethal 
injection protocols should not be restricted to 
instances in which an inmate can identify a specific 
available alternative.  
                                           
17 A protocol may be subject to some scrutiny through state 
administrative enactment procedures, but certain States exempt 
lethal injection protocols from review.  Compare Sims v. Dep’t of 
Corr. & Rehab., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
(invalidating protocol for failure to comply with state administra-
tive procedure act) and Bowling v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corr., 301 
S.W.3d 478, 492 (Ky. 2010) (similar) with Hill v. Owens, 738 
S.E.2d 56, 64 (Ga. 2013) (holding state administrative procedure 
act did not apply to lethal injection protocol, “specifically the 
choice of the drug or drugs that are appropriate at any given 
time”) and Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d 292, 311-12 
(Tenn. 2005) (noting lethal injection protocol exemption from 
state administrative procedure act). 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Tenth Circuit should be 
reversed.  
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